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Like other Caribbean countries, Cuba has adopted policies to relocate populations and prohibit (re)building in
coastal zones at risk of climate change effects. Yet residents do not uniformly see such measures as welfare
promoting and risk reducing, and may resist relocation, even in places where disaster planning is respected and
effective. In such instances, vernacular narratives reveal local understandings of threats, vulnerabilities, and the
measures taken by the state. Drawing on the case of Carahatas, a coastal community in Cuba, this study contrasts
local residents’ understanding of risks with those apparent in public policy. Results from this extensive case study
(2016–2020) reveal how citizens resist relocation and struggle for continuity in a context of marginalization.
Most residents are less afraid of sea level rise than relocation and prefer to maintain their livelihoods and tra
ditions. Local voices reflect a focus on the risks of daily life. Public policies—based on the adaptation-resilience
framework—prioritize instead a longer-term approach, emphasizing safety and best use of state resources over
maintenance of existing livelihoods, settlements, and social networks. Understanding vernacular explanations of
risk and disasters is crucial to develop risk reduction policy that respond to people’s needs and expectations.

1. Introduction
For decades, coastal communities in Cuba have been affected by
meteorological hazards. Residents have learned to face risk and avoid
destruction [1]; they know their territory, and how to protect their be
longings, and how to evacuate. Cuban authorities’ alarm at climate
change and variability (CCV) is prompting plans for the relocation of
people residing in risk-prone coastal areas. But residents in these villages
have a different priority. For them, concerns about sea level rise, heat
waves, or changes in precipitation are secondary to what they deem
more immediate ones such as how to send their children to school or
purchase an indispensable good. The differences in priorities reflect
different perspectives on the nature of risk. They also guide us to chal
lenge the relevance of resilience approaches used by scholars and
disaster experts, and the adequacy of recent policies.
We start with a descriptive question that guides our study: How do
vernacular narratives used to explain CCV-related risks in Cuba differ
from those used by decision makers and academics? To answer this

question, we explore the case of Carahatas, a coastal community in
northern Cuba. We seek to explore current climate change strategies, as
well as to expose local perspectives regarding risk and CCV. We reveal
that when it comes to risks associated with CCV, there is a disconnect
between: (a) the narratives adopted by mainstream academics, inter
national consultants, and most decision makers in Cuba, and (b) the
beliefs, needs and expectations expressed in local residents’ narratives.
We ultimately argue that to make better decisions in the face of global
warming, we must balance the need for change with citizen’s need for
continuity.
The first section of this article summarizes relevant approaches to
disaster risk reduction (DRR) in the context of climate change. The
narratives of resilience and adaptation in the dominant literature
become the foil against which the empirical evidence of local un
derstandings is analyzed. In the methods section, we explain the
empirical approach adopted in Carahatas, which focused on ethno
graphic work and narrative analysis, but also included direct observa
tion, interviews and community meetings. In the results section, we
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highlight the community’s priorities and compare them with govern
ment adaptation strategies and policies. In the discussion section, we
explain the gaps between local understandings of risk in Carahatas and
the frameworks of resilience adopted in mainstream academic discourse
and government approaches to CCV. Finally, we conclude that there is a
need to understand vernacular discourses in the face of climate change
and to include them as the basis for disaster-risk reduction policy in the
Caribbean.

considered examples of “maladaptation” [24]. Finally, other scholars
have claimed that decision makers and scholars typically fail to distin
guish between individuals who are adapting to new risks and those who
are simply surviving [25].
Given such critiques of the mainstream ideas underpinning academic
and policy discourse, some authors have claimed that it is difficult to
address CCV-related risk reduction in the Global South without a thor
ough understanding of the specific politics, stories and problems of
communities at risk [26]. Brown [27] for instance, provides a compre
hensive criticism of resilience. Discussing the use of resilient frameworks
and conceptualizations in development policy, Brown argues that “they
adopt new a new lexicon and some new concepts, but still do not address
fundamental causes—of poverty, inequality, global change or vulnera
bility” (p. 54). However, Brown refuses to abandon the notion of resil
ience. Instead, she proposes revisiting it from a perspective of political
ecology, and a bottom-up, localized and culture-sensitive approach. She
argues that resilience must be based on three pillars: (a) rootedness, seen
as attachment to place and meanings of local action; (b) resistance, seen
as socio-political reaction to power systems; and (c) resourcefulness, or
the capacity to mobilize resources and skills. Other authors have focused
on a more radical approach to decolonizing disaster risk narratives and
scholarship [3], and argue that the understanding and communication
of local narratives is fundamental to balance the influence of Western
academic rhetoric [28]. Our research contributes to such debates by
putting forward structured research into local discourse around what
constitutes risks, what they signify for different people, and how they are
addressed.

2. The hazards of mainstreaming or mainstreaming the hazards
Several authors have recently claimed that terms and concepts
stemming from Western scholarship dominate disaster-related research
and practice in the Global South [2–4]. Abstract concepts such as
“vulnerability,” “resilience,” “informality,” and “adaptation” are prev
alent in disaster studies [5]. Mainstreamed, standardized and inter
nationalized, they are increasingly used as the basis for policies and
programs in the Global South [6]. However, these abstract concepts
often fail to describe phenomena found “on the ground” and, conse
quently, to solve local problems [7,8].
Some authors have claimed that CCV-related studies increasingly
rely on depoliticized ideas [9,10]. One example is the frequently
adopted definition of vulnerability as the “sensitivity or susceptibility to
harm and lack of capacity to cope and adapt” [11]. This definition fails
to capture the political stance that characterized early writings on vul
nerability—see for instance, Hewitt [12]—and the neo-Marxist
approach adopted by some of the proponents of the vulnerability the
ory [13]. In the Pressure and Release (PAR) model, and in more politi
cized definitions of the term, vulnerability is seen as the consequence of
socio-political decisions, and as a characteristic that evolves over time
from “root causes” to “unsafe conditions” [14]. Another example is
adaptation. The 2014 glossary of the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC) defines adaptation as “the process of adjustment
to actual or expected climate and its effects.” Specifically, in human
systems, adaptation seeks to “moderate or avoid harm or exploit bene
ficial opportunities” while in natural systems, human intervention may
facilitate “adjustment to expected climate and its effects” [11]. These
definitions fail to recognize issues of distributive justice, inequalities,
segregation, racism, and other social conditions that must be redressed
to truly avoid disasters.
Despite (or perhaps, because of) this lack of political engagement,
the integration of mitigation and adaptation strategies in the face of CCV
is seen by most authorities, urban consultants, and scholars as an action
that is unavoidable [15] and the backbone of resilience implementation
[16–18]. And yet, since the creation of the PAR model, most social sci
entists agree that marginalization, segregation, colonialism, racism, and
neglect are often the real causes of vulnerability [14]. Several pro
ponents of the vulnerability theory during the 1990s adopted a clear
political stance in their analysis of risk [19], where vulnerability is seen
as the consequence of socio-economic inequalities, typically exacer
bated by neoliberal practices and savage capitalism [13].
Current definitions adopted in CCV policy do not always reflect such
political dimension of risk. In fact, critics deplore that several terms
associated with resilience (such as adaptation, adaptive capacities,
redundancy, and panarchy) do not fully address or explain the under
lying political tensions [8] and real phenomena that shape risk [20].
Others argue that resilience has been hijacked by authorities and po
litical elites [21], and that certain uses of “vulnerability” fail to provide a
proper framework to grasp social injustices [22].
Some authors argue that economic and political elites have used the
resilience discourse to advance neoliberal agendas in both developed
and developing nations [23]. Others note that adaptation policies and
interventions often have perverse effects, “directly increasing vulnera
bility for the targeted and/or external actor(s)” or “eroding pre
conditions for sustainable development by indirectly increasing
society’s vulnerability” [24]. These contrary outcomes are often

3. Four decades of disaster risk reduction without resilience
In 1963, only a few years after the Cuban revolution brought Fidel
Castro to power, the mighty Hurricane Flora hit Cuba. The hurricane
prompted awareness about the need for an organized system to protect
Cubans from natural events. Thirteen years later, after years of exploring
different disaster-risk reduction approaches, the Cuban government
consolidated a comprehensive system locally known as “Civil Defense.”
This system was meant to protect the population and national economy
against destruction caused by military interventions or triggered by
man-made disasters or natural events. It was based on defensive mea
sures that were to be deployed both in peacetime and during exceptional
situations (such as a war or natural events). Over time, this system
achieved considerable success, managing to reduce deaths and injuries
caused by meteorological hazards [29–31].
The Cuban model of protection against danger relies on a dispersed
network of information and institutions at the national, regional,
municipal and neighborhood levels, supported by the government and
the army [30,32–34]. Here the state is responsible for protecting citi
zens, industries, buildings and settlements. Its response to natural haz
ards borrows from principles of defense against a military attack,
including the creation of decentralized centers of response and
decision-making [35]. Organizations led by women and residents play a
crucial role in this decentralized model; the Women’s Federation and the
local Revolutionary Defense Committees are largely responsible for
implementing risk reduction and disaster response measures [33]. The
system provides for rapid response to major events, but also issues early
alerts and deploys strategic risk reduction measures [36].
In Cuba, the Civil Defense model is considered a space for constant
debate and analysis of past events, emerging risks, and better practices
for the future. It includes periodic checks, drills, and training [35]. In
Cuba, a country with a very high level of education, climate change
policy is taken seriously and is driven by science [37]. Risk prevention is
routinely taught in schools and universities. There are strong institutions
devoted to risk management, including planning agencies and disaster
management centers at the national, regional and municipal levels [23].
Information, risk communication, and early alert systems are accurate.
Evacuations are implemented with authority, timeliness, and efficiency.
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daughters, partners, care-givers, communicators and guardians of fam
ily wellbeing.” It claimed that women “supported men who were
depressed and saw their traditional role of ‘providers’ threatened.” The
organization found there was a need to “share all roles, public and pri
vate, between men and women.” It also encouraged including women in
housing construction, an activity that, UNDP found, was traditionally
conducted by men.
The influence of international consultants has slowly percolated into
the discourse of local institutions. For instance, the 2016 National
Environmental Strategy sought to “maintain, restore, and rehabilitate
ecosystems to increase their resilience, and improve the provision of
services that can contribute to climate change adaptation and mitiga
tion” [48]; p. 27). The National Planning Institute argues that the
21st-century challenge for Cuban cities is to become “more resilient”
[49]. The 2018 New Cuban Urban Agenda promoted by UN Habitat and
the National Planning Institute seeks to increase the “resilience of
human settlements and the response capacity against natural and
human-made hazards, enhancing adaptation and mitigation to climate
change” [50]; p. 40).
In 2017, the government approved the program Tarea Vida (Life
Task), Cuba’s strategic plan to fight climate change [51]. The program,
which is based on multidisciplinary scientific knowledge and locally
sensitive implementation [52], is a general framework to deal with
housing, infrastructure, risk awareness, education, and climate-related
technical support. It additionally acts as a “over-arching policy frame
work” to determine regulations for urban and regional planning. One of
its main goals is to “ban construction of new houses in coastal settle
ments at risk of flooding” and to “reduce density in coastal areas.” [53].
Another goal is to “preserve and recuperate the sand beaches of the
Cuban archipelago, prioritizing those that have been built for tourism
purposes and reducing the vulnerability of its built heritage.” A partic
ularly controversial measure is Law No. 212 of 2000, which sets
guidelines for the Urban Planning Office’s safeguarding of communities
and management of risk in coastal zones. Law 212 prohibits construction
and modification of permanent houses in coastal flood-prone zones and,
crucially, states that all communities located in protected coastal areas
must be relocated [54,55]. The law anticipates the “possibility of
consultation with citizens,” but determines that the final outcome
(reducing density in flood-prone areas) is “unavoidable.”
Controversy revolves around both the process and content of Law
212. Some residents believe that its development proceeded without
substantial consultation with coastal villagers; that it significantly harms
social and cultural networks, particularly among fishing communities;
and that it is applied unevenly. Small coastal villages are expected to
relocate, whereas in coastal areas that serve the tourism sector, con
struction of facilities and infrastructure is largely tolerated. Given that
tourism is one of the main components of the local economy, hotels,
resorts, theme parks, and other tourist attractions are sometimes pro
tected through added infrastructure, rather than relocation.
Journalists have struggled to cover the news of resilience measures
and to explain the new jargon [56]. The adoption of a resilience
narrative has sometimes sparked debate and contributed to tensions in
Cuba. A journalist reporting on a 2016 forum on urban resilience in
Cuba, co-organized by the UNDP, explained that for many people,
resilience is “a concept adopted from psychology to refer to individual
adaptation to adverse situations,” whereas for others, “it is a contro
versial concept about facing the negative consequences of the neoliberal
economy” [57]. Such media observations echo the international cri
tiques of resilience in DRR, discussed previously, as full of abstract,
de-localized and de-politicized language that may produce policies that
are irrelevant to local needs, or, worse yet, provoke mal-adaptation,
compounding rather than reducing vulnerability. At the local level, in
coastal communities in Cuba, the new narrative’s influence is apparent
in DRR policies regarding rebuilding and relocation. Our suspicion was
that the new language of resilience and adaptation, and the associated
policies, were not well-understood by coastal villagers and were

The health system is strong and available to everybody. Besides, the
system is supported by strong institutions that provide housing solutions
to low-income families, such as the “Community Architect” [33,38].
Due to the effectiveness of the Civil Defense system, tropical storms
and hurricanes have resulted in very few casualties in Cuba—at least
until five years ago. It must be noted that these same events routinely
killed thousands in Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Puerto Rico, and
other Caribbean islands, and caused millions of dollars in damages in the
southern United States. Despite very limited financial resources and
continued and cruel oppression by the United States government [39],
over the past 40 years Cuba has developed strong social and institutional
capital that makes it less susceptible to suffering from disasters [40]. But
climate change effects and are demanding new and more extreme
measures, and as the sea level rises, new approaches have come from
abroad.
4. From “civil protection” to resilience
Concepts such as resilience, adaptation, and adaptive capacities were
absent in Cuban policy before 2014. They were also absent from the
2015 Plan for Risk Reduction and Vulnerability written by the National
Planning Institute (although a short preface to this plan written by the
UNDP representative in Cuba, mentioned “urban resilience” seven
times, and “capacity/ies” five times). The resilience framework was also
not apparent in local scientific publications, even those specifically
devoted to climate-change induced floods—see, for instance Ref. [41].
For almost forty years, Cuban risk reduction and prevention had been
portrayed as a duty of state protection, never as a “resilience approach.”
But the language used to describe risk and disasters in Cuba is
changing rapidly. Today, many of the risk-related measures adopted in
Cuba are presented or interpreted as resilience strategies, accompanied
by a narrative of adaptation or of development of adaptive capacities. As
the aforementioned preface to the 2015 Plan for Risk Reduction shows,
international agencies are playing an important role in this change in
discourse.
After Hurricane Sandy hit Cuba in 2012, the United Nations Devel
opment Program (UNDP) partnered with local institutions to create a
reconstruction plan based on the notion of “resilient cities.” Two years
later, UNDP published the guidelines for the reconstruction of “resilient
housing” in Santiago de Cuba. This trend towards the new “resilience”
policy continued. In 2015, UN Habitat and UNDP partnered with the
National Planning Institute (Instituto de Planificaci�
on Física) and the Civil
Defense to conduct a project aimed at “enhancing urban resilience in
Cuba.” [42,43]. This work eventually led to the publication of the
“Guide for Urban Resilience,” which instructs municipalities on how to
adopt the resilience framework [44]. Activities to share this approach
with scholars and technocrats followed. In October 2018, UN-Habitat
organized a debate on “urban resilience” [45]. An increasing number
of projects funded by the United Nations agencies in Cuba (including a
project supported by the Sustainable Development Goals Fund in San
tiago de Cuba) now seek to reinforce local or urban resilience. Resilience
has also been applied to other areas, such as energy, agriculture and
forestry. In 2019, for instance, UNDP funded a project to install photo
voltaic panels in almost 1500 houses as part of an initiative to “increase
resilience among communities in the face of extreme meteorological
events through the use of energy renewals” [46]; p. 1). In 2020, UNDP
launched the Coastal Resilience program, aimed at “developing natural
solutions to adaptation to climate change” [47]. The same year, the
Agence française du d�eveloppement, the French foreign aid agency, issued
a call for consultants to enhance resilience in the Cuban city of
Cienfuegos.
Women have always played a crucial role in DRR in Cuba, but the
recent change of language has been accompanied by an even greater
emphasis on gender. In 2014, the UNDP guidelines for post-Sandy
reconstruction argued that women during the disaster “increased their
role and activated their potential and experience as mothers, wives,
3
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promoting policies at odds with their needs. The research, presented
below, indeed found deepening differences between the way risk is
explained and communicated by scholars and authorities, and the way
risk is perceived and lived by residents in disaster-prone areas—notably
those whose voices are less heard. The following sections dwell on these
differences.

3.

5. Methods: Listening to local voices
In order to identify—and eventually amplify—the unheard voices of
people facing climate change impacts in Cuba, we conducted, from 2016
to 2020, an extensive case study in Carahatas, a village located in the
central province of Villa Clara. This site was selected because Carahatas
is one of the coastal villages now facing relocation under Law 212.
Carahatas has a long tradition of varied responses to natural events.
Moreover, its residents have been open to questions and research ac
tivities and researchers were granted the authorizations necessary to
conduct research on site.
We adopted two complementary methodological approaches:
ethnography and narrative analysis. As such, our study entailed analysis
of discourse, and also “living” (or at least “experiencing”) the meanings,
representations and values conveyed by language. Ethnography helped
us to understand risk and disasters as part of complex socio-political
contexts [58], whereas narrative analysis allowed us to distil local ex
planations of that reality and compare it with other representations of it
[59]. Following Hammersley’s principles of ethnography, we both did
ethnography and used ethnographic methods [60]. This was necessary to
achieve what Atkinson [61] calls “textual constructions of reality” in
Carahatas. In the first steps, participant observation was crucial during
community meetings and activities; then we engaged on “explicit
interpretation of the meanings and functions of human actions” [62]; p.
248). We focused on narratives as tools to understand both challenges in
development [63] and explanations of hazards [64]. We conducted
critical discourse analysis as suggested by Fairclough and Wodack [65];
in the sense that we recognized discourse as “ideological work,” that is
rooted in history and becomes the basis for social action.
According to Paschen and Ison (2014, p. 1083) narrative research
offers “an innovative, holistic approach to a better understanding of
socio-ecological systems and the improved, participatory design of local
adaptation policies.” Adopting the approach proposed by Moezzi et al.
[66]; we used narratives as both tools and outputs to collect, analyse,
and critique explanations of risk. Narratives are here the primary
communication tool that people use to improve living conditions and
reduce risk [63,67]. But we also recognize that language has a cultural
and political connotation and tried to reflect these dimensions in the
results explained here.
The empirical study was subject to an Ethics Committee review in
both a local and external university. It included six sources of data:

4.

5.

6.

1. Survey: we conducted a survey consisting of 18 questions that
focused on local practices in response to CCV impacts. We received
86 responses to this survey from community members from both
genders and with diverse roles in the community. Questions
addressed local practices, housing conditions, risk perception, and
perceptions of living conditions. They included: “What are the main
risks that residents face in Carahatas?” “Do you like living in Car
ahatas?” and “Are you willing to participate in the relocation of
Carahatas?” Survey results were analyzed by three local researchers
who wrote research reports that were then compared to identify
common patterns.
2. Interviews within the community: We interviewed 12 community
members, including fishermen, schoolteachers, trainers, cooks, and
housekeepers. Two leaders in the neighborhood and two leaders
from associations, who often act as representatives of vulnerable
groups, were also interviewed. The objective was to reveal detailed
life stories and complement the information gathered in the survey.

We collected testimonies on recent events (including Hurricane Irma
in 2017) and perceptions about them. We gave priority to residents
who had undertaken construction activities in response to weather
events. The interviews were conducted by local researchers in
Spanish, and the transcripts were analyzed by two local researchers,
who then worked together to identify the main categories of analysis.
Interviews outside the community: we interviewed 10 officers from
the main public and private organizations in the region, including
officials who participate in community-level actions, religious
leaders, representatives of the fishing cooperative, and representa
tives of research and planning entities. These latter institutions
included the Urban Planning Office, the Ministry of Science, Tech
nology and Environment, the National Office for the Protection of
Flora and Fauna, the Office of the Community Architect, the
Municipal Civil Defense, and the Director of Finances for the
municipal government.
Focus groups: Three semi-structured focus groups with about ten
locals were conducted in 2016 and 2017. For these meetings, priority
was given to residents whose voices are less heard, notably women
who live alone with their children, elders, and residents with reduced
mobility. The format facilitated open discussions and exchange of
opinions about CCV adaptation practices. Here we recognized that
local residents build or adopt narratives that are useful to them or the
claims that they wish to advance, and leave aside those that are not
[64]. We were therefore careful in contextualizing their explanations
of risk and disasters within their social struggles and the existing
governance structures.
Participant observation: Three researchers visited the site 15 times
during the four years of research. Changes in the built environment
were captured in photographs, plans and drawings. Researchers
observed the social and natural context to reveal recurrent patterns
and to understand the daily activities and routines of villagers. Two
researchers stayed in the village for a period of time, recording in this
way night activities and more profound practices and rituals
(including those associated with fishing activities and the protection
of goods and valuables). Observations were made before and after
the effects of Hurricane Irma in 2017, which allowed researchers to
understand the impact of a major event and to document the mea
sures taken to mitigate its effects.
Review of documents and grey literature: More than 25 official
documents about DRR and climate change responses were analyzed.
They provided both quantitative and qualitative data to complement
and validate information collected in the field. Here we conducted
word counts in order to identify the recurrence of certain terms. After
several iterations and discussions between researchers, we eventu
ally paid particular attention to the Spanish equivalents of the
following terms, that also became categories of analysis: resilience,
adaptation, adaptive capacity/ies, defense, security, social change,
vulnerability, poverty, exclusion, marginalization, and protection.
We have been careful to recognize that some of these terms have
particular connotations in Cuba. “Framing” therefore is a way of
producing social change or maintaining the status quo. “Defense,”
“security,” and “protection,” for instance, are part of the language
used to describe the government’s mission and the responsibility of
the Cuban revolution. As such, these terms are simultaneously
applied to refer to control of criminal activities and to a response to
natural hazards.

The transcripts of interviews and the reports of meetings and focus
groups were subject to an analysis of subject categories and language (all
in Cuban Spanish first, and in a more “international” Spanish later). One
local leader and one representative of the local government were invited
to two research sessions in order to validate and comment on the early
results of the study. They corrected some interpretations and provided
several nuances that are captured in this article. Then data were
analyzed independently by two multidisciplinary groups of researchers
4
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6. Results: A story of conflicting narratives

comprising architects, urban planners, geographers and other social
scientists. Three members of the local group in Cuba are fluent in English
and three members of the international group are bilingual. These two
teams independently identified categories used in these narratives, and
the categories were then compared. At this point, we exchanged re
searchers: one international researcher lived in Cuba for two months and
a Cuban researcher worked in the overseas lab for four months. After
several iterations of ideas an exchanges between the two teams, we
agreed on two main narratives and four constructs that best represent
the empirical outputs.
Given that the team includes researchers from Cuba, other Latin
American countries and non-Spanish speaking regions, we paid partic
ular attention to the translation of terms. It was important that local
terms (those used for construction materials, for instance) were properly
understood in standard Spanish and in English by externals. But, more
importantly, it was crucial to explain the meaning of some local rituals
and the relevance of certain values. For example, it is tempting to
translate “resistir” (to resist) as a capacity. But in conversations with
locals, we noticed that the term was referring not so much to a capacity,
but to an attitude. In local narratives, women who resist a traumatic
event, certainly have capacities to deal with destruction; but they also
have a certain attitude to confront the event; this includes positivity,
faith in a better future, and a determination to get over the event and
“move to something else.” How did we deal with all of this? Conversa
tion proved to be our best tool, but art was useful too. For a few years,
externals not only spent time in Cuba, but focused on reading Cuban
poetry, watching Cuban films, and listening to Cuban music. Art became
a tool to help us disclose hidden messages and to understand some nu
ances in local language. We also spent several hours of dialogue in Cuba
with local residents and abroad between researchers. During the writing
of this article, hours of WhatsApp conversations in Spanish with local
researchers were used to validate terms, adjust arguments and find
specific nuances.
Results were then brought together and discussed to identify com
mon patterns. These patterns were then compared with previous studies
to reach “analytical generalizations” [68]. This paper reports these
patterns and conclusions, structuring them along the four main tensions
we identified.

Carahatas is a village of 591 inhabitants (there were 664 residents in
2017) with a strong local architectural identity and a long history of
fisherfolk traditions and cultural festivals [69]. The first row of houses is
located along the seashore. The rest of the homes—single-story detached
units mostly made of wood or concrete blocks—are located 250–300 m
off the 2019 seashore. Most structures are located on both sides of a
main street that runs parallel to the sea (see Fig. 1). Carahatas has two
small halls for social gatherings, a store, a library, a pharmacy, a phy
sician’s office, and a primary school. Other basic services are located in
the municipality of Quemado de Güines, about 17 km to the south [70].
The village is frequently affected by hurricanes and tropical storms
[71]. It has faced multiple hurricanes including Cake in 1985, Michelle
in 2001, and Irma in 2017. These meteorological events increase the risk
of floods and the penetration of sea water into the settlement. In the
medium term, the village is extremely vulnerable to sea level rise and
seawater surges during tropical storms and hurricanes that are being
exacerbated by climate change. Studies by the Cuban Meteorological
Institute and the Urban Planning Institute [72] predict that at the cur
rent rate of atmospheric temperature increase, half the village’s territory
will be underwater by 2050 and it will be fully submerged by 2100 (see
Fig. 2). Law 124 for the management of, and “adaptation to,” changes in
water sources is now based on such forecasts of sea level rise.
Residents in Carahatas recount their own ways of dealing with
flooding, which are typically seen as “one more challenge” in the daily
struggle of people living in remote, coastal communities in Cuba. As
many as 82% of residents say they like living in the village [55]. Vil
lagers (mostly fisherfolk) see climatological events as a regular part of
their lives. They say they are used to dealing with water, which they
depict as an integral and dynamic component of their lives and envi
ronment. “We have spent a lot of time on the sea,” one senior fisherman
says, “we know it. If you don’t know the sea you should not be in it. If
you are afraid of it you should not get in contact with it. I know how to
navigate both during the day and at night” [73].
Roles are sometimes clearly defined according to gender. Men tend
to work in fishing activities (the local fishing cooperative has 124 men
and 14 women members), and therefore are sometimes absent from
home for long stretches of time. Nearly a quarter of all residents are
women who stay at home and take care of domestic chores, children, the
elderly, and domestic animals. Women teach children at the school and

Fig. 1. Map of Carahatas, including the location of the village in the island.
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Fig. 2. Map of the village showing areas expected to be flooded in 2050 and 2100.

6.1. Living with hazards: “Living with scars”

organize cultural and social activities, including the annual Sea Festival.
Additionally, women sometimes help distribute the products of fishing
activities. Finally, as we shall see below, women play a crucial role in
risk management in Carahatas, a dynamic that is well known within and
outside the community. Their interests are often represented by the
Women’s Federation.
Members of the community take care of the most vulnerable, such as
children, women living alone, and elders. In case of emergency, “men
and the representatives of the Civil Defense are the last group to evac
uate the village” [70]; p. 57). However, CCV is having an especially
strong effect on a series of activities that women are conventionally in
charge of, such as water collection and management. With longer pe
riods of draught, it is becoming more difficult for residents in general,
and women in particular, to ensure that there is water available for
domestic activities. Another example is food security, another aspect of
domestic and collective life in which women have a crucial role. CCV is
significantly affecting the availability of food, and it is becoming
increasingly cumbersome for women to access meat, fruit, and
vegetables.
Academic terms such as resilience, adaptation, mitigation and
vulnerability (that is, their equivalents in Spanish), are seldom used by
residents. Locals only use these terms when academics, technocrats,
international consultants, and politicians bring them to the conversa
tion. Instead, locals use a vernacular language that reflects and describes
their daily practices. They refer to “protection,” “solidarity,” “collabo
ration,” “care,” and “continuity.” In local narratives, water is perceived
as a dynamic force that benefits the community and that is directly
connected to people’s identity and existence. “Water has never hurt me,”
says a local fisherman when asked about climate change risks; “only
people have.”
Storms and floods may be disruptive, but not in the ways conven
tionally seen by outside experts; villagers instead point to the local
practices they adopt to protect themselves, to the potential opportunities
for home improvements in the wake of disaster, and to the loss of key
services that are due, not to storms, but to Law 212 measures purport
edly aimed at protecting them. As we will show below, residents explain
risk in Carahatas via two core narratives: the first focuses on the impacts
of living with natural events; the second on the need for continuity despite
these natural events.

~os (residents of Carahatas) live with risk, and do not claim
Carahaten
to have developed resilience mechanisms (mecanismos de resiliencia).
They do claim, however, that decision makers and academics often
underestimate their knowledge and the value of their local practices to
protect themselves.
Residents have specific risk-management knowledge acquired
through local innovation and trial-and-error responses to past events.
Houses in Carahatas and other costal villages used to be built of wood
and on stilts, and roofs used to be covered in guano (leaves from palm
trees). Wood and guano provided flexibility and allowed for proper
ventilation within homes. Such structures were also easier and less
expensive to repair than those made of bricks, cement sheets, and con
crete blocks. But today, villagers prefer houses that combine wood and
cinderblocks and use fiber-cement corrugated sheets for roofs. To be
sure, they still build passages, storage spaces, and bathrooms on stilts,
and they still use guano for secondary structures. Even though the use of
“permanent” components such concrete and bricks in flood-prone areas
is banned by Law 212, residents are increasingly using these materials to
build their homes. One of the reasons is that wood is hard to find and
expensive. Besides, as we shall see below, villagers have found innova
tive ways of combining the strength of cinderblocks and stone with the
flexibility of wood.
Residents have developed several methods to protect their houses
and belongings. These practices rely on the experience and knowledge
that residents—especially women—have gained over time. But they also
depend on families’ economic standpoint. Fisherfolk usually have better
incomes than the rest of the families in Carahatas, between six and ten
times the average salary. Remittances from family members living
abroad are another source of money for villagers. Families with higher
income and access to remittances can pay in advance for materials and
labor. Thus, they often benefit from discounts and can act faster to
recover from disasters. In contrast, residents who do not practice fishing
or receive remittances rely solely on government subsidies after di
sasters and, for them, recovery is often slower.
Some actions include raising furniture from the floor (temporarily or
permanently), reinforcing roof structures periodically, developing sys
tems to seal windows and doors, and securing belongings located out
doors (see Figs. 1–4). Residents also build barriers to stop the flow of
water and create walkways and elevated roads to move between
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Fig. 3. Barriers built by residents to prevent flooding. Left: made of wood. Right: stone.

people have two or three days to prepare before a storm. Women in
Carahatas use this time to protect valuable items, pets, and other ani
mals. While some furniture is elevated permanently, such as by being
placed on blocks, other goods are moved shortly before a storm (see
Fig. 7): furniture, appliances, and goods are raised within houses using
pulleys, and interior boards are installed to serve as off-ground storage.
To protect domestic animals, community members build cages of wood
and wire mesh that they place on stilts, at heights dependent on the
water level marks left by previous floods (see Figs. 7 and 8). Solidarity
plays a crucial role in both risk reduction and emergency measures. Even
though many of the activities are conducted at the household level,
evacuations are seen as a collective endeavour, where community
members in general, and the Civil Defense representatives in particular,
are expected to “protect” the most vulnerable.
People in Carahatas also deploy a retrofitting strategy that local re
�s de la fachada or “behind the façade.” This solution
searchers call detra
consists of constructing a stronger, inner, house, while leaving the
original wooden walls as the exterior. Since the use of concrete bocks
and bricks in façades is forbidden by law, this strategy allows residents
to reinforce their homes without showcasing their violation of regula
tions. Besides, exposed concrete block walls are vulnerable to saltwater
and humidity, and thus, the wood exterior helps protect the structural
walls.
Community members have lived in this territory for several gen
erations—only 3% have lived in the village for less than 20 years [55].
Community members often observe that “the blows teach you some
~an). They know how to rebuild and have learned
thing” (los golpes ensen
several lessons in the process. Survey respondents mention the experi
ence of rebuilding after a storm as leading them to realize that continuity
in the village is not only possible, but preferable (at least for the ma
jority). According to one resident, “If something falls, we build it up
again.” They see the village as a dynamic organism that has learned to
“live with scars” (viviendo con las cicatrices). Residents often remark that,
�). A catastrophic event is
“Life has always been like this” (asi es la vida aca

Fig. 4. Ditch and canals built by residents to prevent flooding on a main road.

structures (see Figs. 3 and 4). These paths are often made of wood and
connect houses to the bathrooms, which are built close to the sea and on
stilts. Residents also build canals next to roads to improve water
drainage and thus prevent floods.
Homes are constructed to minimize construction costs as well as
damage from floods. People in Carahatas elevate the ground level of the
house, securing belongings during moderate floods. The bottom part of
external walls, as well as columns within and outside houses are rein
forced with stronger materials like stone and concrete (see Figs. 5 and 6).
With this solution, households save on expensive materials, because the
rest of the house can then be built with wood.
Another generalized practice is to raise valuables, such as furniture
and animals, high aboveground before tropical storms and hurricanes
arrive. Given that Cuba has an efficient early warning system, most

Fig. 5. Elevation of the mean level of the floor within and outside homes.
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Fig. 6. Reinforced columns and sidewalls of houses in Carahatas.

Fig. 7. Left: A bed permanently raised on blocks. Right: Temporary elevated storage of a rocking chair.

Fig. 8. Animal pens and cages on stilts.

simply “another day that might leave one of those scars.” But, re
spondents contend, disasters are events that are “best left in the past”
and, like other scars, they learn to live with them. In Carahatas, residents
accept meteorological events and see them as part of regular life.

destruction. They see substantial benefits to maintaining their residence
along the coast, and numerous downsides to relocation. As one villager
summarized, “As long as we are allowed, living here is still possible.”
Some villagers recognize that at one moment the village will have to be
relocated eventually, but they see this relocation in the very long term
and want to make sure that the timeline is not unnecessarily hastened.
Villagers say they can rely on a good system of information that
permits both advance notice of extreme events and sharing of knowl
edge on how to deal with challenges. The alarm system allows for
organized evacuations; vulnerable people—such as the elderly, pregnant
women, women with infants, and people who live alone—are the first to
be relocated. People trust authorities and their capacity to conduct
timely and efficient evacuations and temporary relocation.
Community members often argue that “the sea is not the enemy.”

6.2. Continuity despite hazards: “As long as we are allowed, living here is
still possible”
So Carahatas residents “live with the scars” of past events and draw
lessons from previous experiences to help prepare for the future. Com
munity members know that there are significant hazards affecting
coastal areas and that they are particularly vulnerable [74]. But, at the
same time, they are not too worried about natural hazards and say that
technocrats and external consultants overestimate the risks of
8
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Although experts predict that the first row of houses will be flooded
within 30 years [41,75], villagers say they do not fear the consequences
of raising water levels. They see coastlines as fluid. Water now covers
parts of the settlement that were dry a few years ago, but locals observe
that other areas are no longer navigable by boat due to ongoing sedi
ment accumulation. While elders contend that the intensity of hurri
canes has increased, they see it as normal that, from time to time, a
strong natural event reminds them of “the mighty power of nature.”
Residents respect the ocean, but rarely fear its influence on the village.
In fact, almost no changes can be see in the settlement, or its layout,
despite the number of minor events and major disasters that have hit it
in the past years. The changes that have occurred are as much a product
of government policy as of hazardous events. For instance, the so-called
Pioneers Palace of Coastal Marine, a youth recreation center and study
place, was destroyed by Hurricane Michelle in 2001. The government
reopened it in the city of Quemado de Güines, about 17 km from Car
ahatas. But at a distance, the youth center is almost useless for the
Carahatas community where young residents say they “don’t have a
place to have fun anymore.” Similarly, new regulations on public se
curity now prevent children from embarking on fishing boats. Residents
argue that children’s participation is crucial to preserving know-how of
fishing and work at sea. In the absence of local employment and
educational opportunities, teenagers and youngsters who want to work
or study move to Quemado de Güines, Santa Clara, and other larger
cities.
In social and economic spheres, lack of change is a central problem.
In addition to a paucity of social spaces for youth, some medical services
needed by the elderly, among others, are unavailable in Carahatas.
Given the area’s designation as a no-build zone, investments in
expanding services and amenities in the village are unlikely. Local
employment alternatives to the fishing boats are similarly limited and
seen as unlikely to expand. Several years ago, decision-makers launched
an initiative to farm lobsters and harvest sea sponges in an attempt to
diversify the local economy. This business did not produce the expected
results. The initiative received support from international charities and
brought economic benefits to some local villagers in its early stages. But
observers mentioned that it was doomed to failure, citing the ideas’ and
funding’s origin outside Cuba. The result was a weak alignment with
wider Cuban plans and social programs and a lack of proper training and
operational support for the people in charge, which eventually led to
failure. Stories about the experience communicate a tone of frustration
common to local conversations about new economic activities in the
region; as one resident quipped, “We are not allowed to improve
ourselves.”
Residents often refer to common priorities such as getting kids to
school, purchasing essential goods like hygiene products (often scarce
due to the American embargo), and access to equipment and medicine.
Despite the hardships, though, most respondents state they prefer to
maintain their residence in Carahatas, to evacuate only during weather
events, and—once hazardous conditions subside—to return and repair
their homes. “If the government ever forces me to leave,” one woman
said, “I would rather live on my boat than relocate to one of the apart
ment buildings inland.” While this “return and rebuild” practice leads to
a high debt burden among those residents who repeatedly opt for loans
to repair their homes, they still prefer it to the disruptions, risks, and
uncertainty of relocation. Most of the elderly do not want to relocate
because “the sea is all [they] know” and they have a sense of belonging
to the community and the territory. Although some respondents said
they liked the prospect of moving closer to family members elsewhere in
Cuba, many elders repeated: “We know the effects of climate change,
and still we wish to die close to the sea.”
Hesitations regarding relocation are compounded by the lessons of
the past. Previous relocation initiatives are viewed by locals as ineffec
tive. For instance, a few years ago, several families were relocated from
Carahatas to a new development of five-story high apartment buildings
called Lutgardita. A similar relocation process happened in the coastal

village of Isabela de Sagua, where residents were moved to apartment
buildings inland. Many of those relocated suffered psychological effects;
others refused to move. In Carahatas, another relocation project moved
about 60 families to two-storey attached units located in “safe” areas
inland. Post-occupancy surveys find that the “solution” created new
problems: for example, the second, higher level of the new houses often
remains unused because elders and others with reduced mobility cannot
easily access it.
Most local decision makers are now at a crossroads in how to apply
current regulations. Law 212 is a policy at the national scale that does
not fit particularly well with the characteristics of places like Carahatas
or Isabela de Sagua. Local political leaders are aware of the construction
and reconstruction activities occurring in coastal communities. They
recognize that the risks of relocating are, for many coastal residents,
greater than those of remaining in place. They see that local people
prioritize a sense of belonging and the known challenges of daily life
over what seems to them an extreme and precipitous response to the
uncertain risk of floods. Many local officials are now helping fishermen
in their reconstruction efforts, but fear that such support may result in
punishment by national authorities.
7. Discussion: four tensions in DRR
Terms linked to the resilience framework, such as mitigation,
adaptation, and adaptive capacities, are increasingly used in DRR policy
in Cuba and many other countries in the Global South. They are now
used to justify extreme risk-reduction measures such as Law 212. De
cisions in the face of CCV are also increasingly based on terms that are
closer to a narrative of enforced change than a narrative of tolerance,
continuity, and social justice. As such, these decisions are becoming
disconnected from the reality of residents in coastal villages.
Previous studies have found that the resilience framework, a notion
largely developed in the Global North, is increasingly adopted in the
Global South [4]. Mainstream implementations of the “adaptation”
concept has often failed to include the more concrete, day-to-day
perspective of the communities at risk. In many cases, the narratives
about how to continue living in flood-prone areas and preserving local
traditions have been largely missing from CCV-related policy. There is,
therefore, a tension between protecting residents by reducing their
inherent social and economic vulnerabilities, and protecting them at all
costs through permanent relocation. By applying Law 2012 indiscrim
inately, authorities might overlook the risks and vulnerabilities that are
created by relocation of coastal communities.
Our empirical study revealed four main tensions, each of which
highlights mismatches between new resilience policy and local realities:
1st tension –Living with hazards vs. securing public safety: Villagers see
the primary risk as that of moving from where they have friendships,
history, livelihoods and a link to the water; they prioritize continuity
and a sense of belonging. Government officials prioritize public safety
and, though not always stated, investments that will generate benefits
over many years (or at least ones that will not be washed away by next
year’s storm). Differing understandings of risks, of the timeframes
within which they are experienced, and of the ways in which difficulties
are managed, accepted, or avoided have generated conflicts over the
new resilience-oriented regulations. Such differences mean Carahatas
residents often find it hard to accept that relocation will reduce the risks
they face in the short to medium term, and thus to make sense of the
national government’s relocation dictates.
2nd tension – External control vs. local autonomy: The plans and stra
tegies designed to face CCV set actions to be applied across a wide range
of sectors and communities, regardless of local characteristics. Each
community has singularities and methods to face natural hazards. But
local governments do not, at least in the Cuban context, have the au
thority to make exemptions or to give specific settlements more auton
omy than others. Even if local residents communicate their expectations
and urgent needs to local officials, they still have to comply with
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national regulations even when they know they lead to poor results.
Places like Carahatas enjoy a form of complacency from their local
government, which is not yet fully enforcing Law 212 and acts as an
intermediary between locals and national authorities. But residents fear
that the central government, which sometimes applies measures more
stringently, will actively intervene. This applies to housing construction,
but also to regulation of livelihoods and economic activities. Fishing
activities, for instance, are regulated by the national government. Onesize-fits-all regulations of economic activities make it hard for villagers
to innovate, start new initiatives, and modify their practices to respond
to local conditions.
3rd tension – Utopian solutions vs. pragmatism: Most people in Car
ahatas believe that the village relocation program promoted by Law 212
is a utopian solution. Many recognize that in a system where housing
must be guaranteed by authorities, the government does not have
enough resources to apply this principle at large. They thus find a gap
between policy intentions and the pragmatic means to achieve them.
Many residents find it problematic that in this context, Law 212 is
applied indiscriminately to coastal villages, rather than according to
studies and technical data about local socio-economic risks in each
village.
4th tension – investment in small village vs. elsewhere: Residents also
suspect that economic returns on investments are a factor, though they
state this is simpler terms. They recognize, for instance, that there is a
lack of economic activity in Carahatas compared to that which exist
s—to a certain extent—in Quemado de Güines. Given the political sys
tem in place, there are no market pressures on housing and land in Cuba.
But residents sometimes resent that coastal villages are not seen as
generators of wealth or as administratively important. Their populations
often have little access to construction materials, must rely on a limited
number of traditional technologies, and have few financial opportu
nities. Large cities, such as La Havana and Santiago are also at risk of
CCV effects, but, there, people have access to various materials, con
struction technologies, and financial investments, including those
coming from the national government. Villagers question the fairness of
limiting their own opportunity to stay in place, rebuild, and solve their
housing needs. Previous studies have examined how citizens faced with
risk must fight capitalist and neoliberal interests, which are often pro
moted by political and economic elites. This paper reveals that differ
ences in the perceptions of vulnerabilities in the absence of market
pressures also determine different risk-management approaches.
How representative is Carahatas of other coastal villages and set
tlements in Cuba? Our work in the province of Villa Clara, where Car
ahatas is located, suggests that even though conditions in Carahatas are
particular, several coastal communities are facing similar challenges and
tensions as those presented above. As mentioned above, a relocation
project was completed a few years ago in Isabella de Sagua, and several
members of the community have reported psychological distress after
relocation. Plans to enforce Law 212 also exist for other locations,
including Caibari�en.
This study faces two main limitations. First, we focused on one
community at risk of droughts, hurricanes and floods. This case is
probably not generalizable to other threats such as earthquakes (a risk
that is present in cities on the eastern part of the island) and heat waves.
Second, it focused on conditions in the built environment, with only
sparse references to other important aspects of well-being such as public
health, education, security and livelihoods.

And yet, measures to address CCV produce winners and losers, and
creates tensions that are overlooked in both local policy and interna
tional guidelines such as those produced by UN Habitat and UNDP.
Residents of Carahatas explain risks and threats through a narrative
of continuity and social struggle that is often overlooked by climate
change adaptation policy and international frameworks. This narrative
is based on two main pillars. First, the acceptance of natural events as
being part of their daily lives. Second, the idea of continuing current
modes of living, despite imminent threats. Given this understanding of
space, place and time, villagers transform their houses, land, and prac
tices to maintain a connection to traditions, local values, and community
rituals. They adopt a language of social struggle to ask authorities for
socially just treatment and support for local initiatives. But they also
adopt a narrative of tolerance to ask authorities for permission to remain
in their location and improve their conditions by themselves. These
narratives highlight four tensions that exist today in CCV-related policy
in Cuba. Revealing these tensions contributes to a better understanding
of competing objectives about protection and risk reduction. A deep
analysis of these tensions also sheds light on the challenges that exist in
the actual system.
Vernacular narratives should be the starting point of policy in Cuba
and other Caribbean nations. The idea of continuity of communities at
risk should be respected. Academics must help understand the expec
tations and needs of communities at risk. The inclusion of local beliefs
and the narrative of continuity in research can help improve policies and
decisions in Cuba and might lead to better prevention of loss of resources
and people.
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